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Abstract
Misperception of objects is a major cause of inaccuracies in adults’
drawing. It has previously been established that participants’ drawings are
biased by their knowledge of the drawn object. We hypothesized that additional
inaccuracy arises because drawings are biased towards participants’
idiosyncratic canonical representations of the object. We report that
participants’ free drawings of a cylinder are correlated with their observational
drawings of the same shape, providing evidence that people’s observational
drawings are distorted by their individual schematic representations of the
objects in question. It is unclear whether this reflects a perceptual distortion or a
bias in drawing production; in either case, this result provides a further
explanation for why people are poor at drawing from observation.
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Another reason why adults find it hard to draw accurately
Why do most people find it so difficult to make observational drawings?
Cohen & Bennett (1997) established that the primary source of errors in adults’
observational drawings is misperception of the object. A major contributor to
this misperception is participants’ knowledge about the properties of the object
they are drawing. For example, Taylor & Mitchell (1997) established that
adults’ knowledge contaminates their perceptions. These authors presented
participants with an illuminated disc in a dark chamber devoid of perspective
cubes, and asked them to match a computer generated ellipse to the model. Half
of the participants were shown at the start of the experiment that the disc was in
fact circular; half were not. The former group exaggerated the circularity of the
ellipse while the latter group did not, providing evidence that knowledge of the
stimulus’ true shape contaminated judgments of its appearance. In a more
recent study, Mitchell, Ropar, Ackroyd, & Rajendran (2005) demonstrated that
such misperceptions lead to drawing errors. Thus adults, like children, seem to
“draw what they know” rather than what they see.
Work such as this strongly suggests that adults’ drawings are inaccurate
because they misperceive the model object, and that this misperception arises
partly because of knowledge about the “true” form of the shape they are
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drawing. However, these studies have investigated the extent to which
everyone’s drawings are biased towards the same internal, knowledge-based
representation – e.g. a circle. Yet it may also be that each person has his or her
own internal, schematic representation of a given object, and that each
participant’s observational drawing is pulled towards this unique canonical
representation. (Note that we, like e.g. Picard & Durand (2005), use the term
canonical to refer to an internal representation of an object or shape which can
differ between individuals).
We can seek to establish an individual’s canonical representation by
asking him or her to produce a free drawing, a technique employed by many
researchers investigating children’s drawings including, recently, Picard &
Durand (2005). These authors asked 4-6 year old children to produce a free
drawing of a saucepan before attempting observational drawings of a 3D
saucepan with its handle in different orientations. They found that, although not
the only source of error, the youngest children showed a tendency to draw the
handle in the same orientation as in their free drawings. This canonical bias
diminished with age, but we hypothesized that, with a more subtle test, adults
might reveal the same tendency to bias their observational drawings towards
their (individually varying) canonical representations of the object.
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To test this possibility, we asked 72 participants to produce a line
drawing of a cylinder based upon their mental representations of this shape.
They then spent approximately ten minutes completing a separate experiment,
before being asked to draw a (previously concealed) cylinder from observation.
The cylinder stood upright on a table and was 26cm high and 8cm in diameter.
Participants used a chin-rest set 82cm from the base of the cylinder; eye-level
was 41cm above the table.
One participant was discarded because her free drawing was of a
cuboid. For the remaining 142 drawings both authors independently measured
the lengths labelled A, B, C and D in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. The measurements taken from each drawing. Length A was
measured for both left and right sides, and an average taken.
Inter-rater agreement was excellent (R2 > 0.98) and the two
measurements for each length were averaged. To control for individual
differences in the absolute size of the shapes drawn, we focussed on the ratios
of the lengths measured (Mitchell et al, 2005). There were six ratios of interest:
A/B, A/C, A/D, B/C, B/D and C/D. Values were log-transformed to improve
normality. We performed correlation analysis to see whether the ratios that
participants used in their free drawings predicted the corresponding ratios in
their observational drawings. Participants’ free drawings fell into two groups:
those where the cylinder was upright with the ellipse at the top (N=48), and
those where the cylinder was on its side, with the ellipse at the front (N=23).
Table 1 shows the results for both groups separately, and when group is
ignored.
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A/B A/C A/D B/C B/D C/D
Upright rp
.336
.020
.300
.038
.434
.003
.255
.080
.458
.001
.275
.065
Side rp
.277
.200
.212
.332
.110
.618
.059
.790
.104
.319
.279
.198
Collapsed rp
.352
.003
.176
.141
.321
.007
.112
.351
.421
.001
.144
.239
Table 1. Correlations between ratios in free drawings and the corresponding
ratios in the observational drawings. Values are Pearson’s r with corresponding
p-value (two-tailed). Two participants produced flat lines at the base of their
drawings (i.e. D was zero); ratios involving D could not be computed for these
participants and they were excluded from these correlations.
All of the examined correlations are positive; when canonical
orientation is ignored, three of the six correlations are highly significant and, in
the case of the participants whose free drawings were upright, four are
significant and the remaining two approach significance. This provides strong
evidence that participants’ observational drawings are biased towards their
idiosyncratic canonical representations of the shape. We emphasize that this
result is very different from previous findings showing that drawings are
contaminated by knowledge of object properties. All participants may make
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their drawing of the top surface of the cylinder overly circular because they
know the geometric properties of the model shape. Indeed, comparison of the
ratio B/C in the observational drawings with the ratio in a photograph taken
from the participants’ position showed that people significantly “circularized”
their drawings. However, the shape towards which the observational drawing is
biased must be the same for everyone (since presumably everyone knows that a
cylinder has circular ends). As such, this factor cannot explain the correlations
between free drawings and observational drawings that we found. Moreover,
some of the ratios correlated between the canonical and observational drawings,
such as the height-to-width ratio (A/B), do not have any obvious connection
with knowing about object properties. Irrespective of any tendency to make the
drawing look like what they know about the model cylinder, participants make
their observational drawings look like their individual canonical
representations.
It is noticeable that none of the correlations were significant for
participants whose canonical cylinders were lying on their side. This may be
because of low statistical power: there were only 23 people in this group, and
their drawings were relatively similar. However, it may also be because their
canonical representations involved a different viewpoint from that of the
upright model cylinder, an intriguing possibility which merits future study. It is
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also noticeable that, when canonical orientation is ignored, none of the
significant correlations involve C (the depth of the ellipse). One possible
explanation for this is that, since this dimension is particularly sensitive to
knowledge of the object’s “true” shape, there is less inter-individual variation in
participants’ canonical representations of this aspect of the stimulus. Again, this
possibility is amenable to future investigation.
One limitation of the current result is that it is not clear whether the
correlation between free and observational drawings reflects a bias of
perception or of production. It may be that each participant’s perception of the
model cylinder is biased towards his or her idiosyncratic canonical
representation (or towards the memory of the recently produced free drawing).
Alternatively, the free drawings may represent each participants’ understanding
of how such a shape should be drawn; when they make their observational
drawings, they make use of the same production schema. Disentangling these
possibilities will be a useful direction for future research. In either case, it
seems that part of the reason why adults struggle to produce accurate drawings
is because they are biased towards using certain proportions which are specific
to the individual and independent of both the appearance of the object in front
of them and their knowledge of that object.
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